Substantive Democracy and the Economy: An Analysis through the Lens of the Capabilities Approach

Muhammad BA

Gaston Berger University, Saint-Louis, June 2025

Introduction

The capabilities approach offers a relevant theoretical framework for rethinking the relationship between the economy and democracy, based on an ethics grounded in real freedoms. Amartya K. Sen (1992), in his book “ Rethinking Inequalities ”, presents the two fundamental branches of economic science: mechanics — which describes behaviour and equilibria — and ethics — which evaluates social outcomes in terms of normative values. In his works “ Economics is a Moral Science ” and “Economics and Ethics ”, Sen emphasises the urgent need to reintegrate ethics into the heart of economic thinking, thereby breaking with the dominant utilitarian reductionism.

The capabilities approachtakes a critical stance towards welfare-based and classical utilitarian paradigms, particularly those inspired by Jeremy Bentham, which define the good in terms of maximising theutility of the greatest number. Although sensitive to consequences, this approach is not limited to an assessment of final outcomes: rather, it proposes an analysis based on  overall outcomes, that is, processes, effective freedoms and individual responsibility (Sen, 2009). As such, it combines elements of consequentialism with a deontological requirement inspired by Kant, emphasising freedom of choice and human dignity as normative foundations.

It is from this perspective that the capabilities approach enables a renewed analysis of the links between the economy and democracy. Far from reducing the latter to electoral procedures or formal institutions, Sen (2009) offers an enriched interpretation, based on three functions: democracy has an instrumental value, as a mechanism for preventing injustices (as demonstrated by his work on famines in India, Africa and China); an intrinsic value, as political participation is fundamental to human well-being; and a constructive value, insofar as public deliberation enables society to collectively define what matters in a just society.

The famines analysed by Sen (1981) clearly illustrate the scope of this concept. This phenomenon does not necessarily result from a lack of resources, but from a failure to ensure rights of access to those resources. However, as Sen observes, no famines have been recorded in democratic states with a free press and an active opposition. Democracy plays a key role here, in line with the analyses of Nobel laureates Robinson & Acemoglu (2012) on the role of inclusive institutions in economic development.

But the capabilities approach goes further: it offers an intrinsic and constructive vision of democracy, based on effective participation, public reasoning and the freedom toaction. It invites us to view the democratic actor not merely as a voter, but as a moral agent capable of contributing to the construction of the common good. This perspective allows us to rethink the role of the economy in democracy, no longer as a mere maximisation of aggregate utility, but as a lever for expanding real freedoms and strengthening social justice.

This paper therefore seeks to demonstrate how the capabilities approach can serve as the foundation for a substantive democracy, by linking real freedom, political participation and the role of agency. It isis organised around three main themes. Firstly, it proposes the space of capabilities as the normative foundation for democratic assessment. Secondly, it demonstrates the role of public reasoning in the formation of collective choices and the construction of metrics for social progress. Finally, it addresses participation in political life and freedom ofagency as ethical ends to be taken into account in understanding real democracy. But first, an overview is provided of the theoretical foundations of the capabilities approach as developed by Sen.

1. Theoretical and conceptual foundations of the capabilities approach.

The capabilities approach provides a theoretical framework that enables us both to assess and compare individuals’ quality of life or well-being, on the one hand, and to theorise the foundations of social justice, on the other (Nussbaum, 2012: 18). According to Sen (2012: 285), the capabilities approach provides an informational basis on which to focus when assessing and comparing overall individual benefits.

From these two definitions, it is clear that the capabilities approach is not a closed normative theory, but rather a general framework for evaluation that can be applied for various purposes and across a range of disciplines. It is based on two fundamental concepts that form its conceptual core: functions and capabilities.

Functionings correspond to the “doings” (doings) and ‘beings’ (beings) that a person realises over the course of their life. These are their actual achievements. These doings may be basic — being in good health, having enough to eat, escaping avoidable mortality (Sen, 2000: 75) — or more complex, such as participating in community life or enjoying positive self-esteem (Sen, 2000: 106).

Capabilities, on the other hand, refer to therange of combinations of actions that a person can potentially carry out. In other words, they are the actual abilities to ‘be’ or ‘do’ what one values. Capabilities thus represent real freedoms, or substantive freedoms.

To incorporate the notion of freedom into the definition of capabilities, Sen adopts a counterfactual line of reasoning: wouldit been possible for a person to be or do something other than what they currently are or do? If the answer is yes, then that person hasgenuine freedom of choice. Thus, capability can be defined as the genuine freedom an individual has to lead the life they wish — or, more precisely, the genuine opportunities available to them.

Beyond these two central concepts, the capabilities approach, from an Aristotelian perspective, introduces a distinction between means and ends. Sen emphasises that, whilst resources (income, Rawls’s ‘basic goods’) are certainly important, they do not necessarily guarantee the attainment of well-being. For example, two people may have the same amount of food, but their nutritional well-being may differ, due to factors such as metabolism or pregnancy.

This difference in outcomes can be explained by the existence of conversion factors, another key concept in the capabilities approach. These factors — detailed by Sen (1985, 2000b, 2012)— may be: individual (age, sex, health status, metabolism); social (gender norms, ethnicity, social status); and environmental (climate, infrastructure, geography). These factors make it possible to incorporate inter-individual heterogeneities into the assessment of well-being, that is to say, the fact that equal resources do not lead to equal outcomes.

The capabilities approach thus links resources, conversion factors, capabilities and functions. Resources, transformed by conversion factors, give rise to a set of actual opportunities (capabilities). From among these, the individual exercises their freedom of choice to carry out certain functions.

Let’s take an example: a person has a sufficient income. For them to have the freedom to be well-nourished, there must be roads connecting their village to the market; no social norms must prevent them from going there (for example, because of their gender or religious beliefs); and they must actually wish to feed themselves.

Thus, a person may have sufficient income and access to the market, yet choose not to feed themselves — as in the case of an ascetic monk practising voluntary fasting. This monk and a poor, undernourished individual may share the same outcome (not being well-nourished), but their capabilities are very different. The former freely chooses to fast; the latter is compelled to do so by a lack of resources. It isis this distinction between realisation and the freedom to realise it—or between the final outcome and the overall outcome—that constitutes the full analytical richness of the capabilities approach.

2. The space of capabilities as a normative framework for substantive democracy.

Substantive democracy isis assessed, according to authors such as Sen (2000b) and Nussbaum (2008; 2012), in terms of the extent of individuals’ well-being freedoms. Individual freedoms, in the capabilities approach, include negative freedoms and positive freedoms, as defined by Isaiah Berlin (1958). Negative freedom refers to the absence of external constraint or interference in theindividual’s actions. For example, having the right to move freely at any time within a city or to vote.

In addition to this negative liberty, there is a positive liberty, which corresponds to the individual’s actual ability to exercise that liberty. Let us return to the previous example: a person may formally have the right to move about freely (negative freedom), but may be prevented from doing so in practice due to the risk of physical assault by criminal gangs.

In Sen’s (1999) conception, negative freedoms are not opposed to positive freedoms. On the contrary, the two forms together constitute individual freedoms and are both necessary for the development of capabilities. It is within this broader framework that the capabilities approach proposes to conceptualise individual well-being. Freedom of well-being thus refers to the totality of real possibilities available to a person to lead the life they have good reason to value.

According to Sen (2000a), if we accept that well-being can be defined as fulfilment, then ‘a person’s capabilities bear a relevant relation to their well-being on account of two distinct but related considerations ’ (Sen, 2000a: 77). These considerations point to a dual relationship – indirect and direct – between capabilities and well-being, which can also be interpreted as a dichotomy between freedom as a process and freedom as an opportunity.

The indirect relationship is based on thethe idea that a point in the space of functionings can be regarded as a vector of functionings, and that capability is the set of these vectors. From this perspective, capability, as actual freedom, contributes to the analysis of individual well-being, by enabling one to ‘know the value of the cards one holds in one’s hand within society’ (Sen, 2000a: 76). More specifically, having a broader capability space enables one to realise a greater number of functionings, which expands the dimensions of well-being. Thus, capabilities have instrumental value in the realisation of well-being, as the freedom to choose between different ways of functioning is valued as a democratic process.

Conversely, if we consider the options for choice themselves as dimensions of life, then a second, direct relationship emerges between capability and well-being. In this case, capability, understood as the freedom to choose, is in itself a valuable component of well-being. Following this logic, capability has intrinsic value. The ability to make a choice between several options is, in the capabilities approach, an essential element of human existence. It is in this sense that Sen states: ‘Acting freely and being able to choose are […] direct constituents of well-being’ (Sen, 2000a: 93). Leading a freely chosen way of life is not the same as conforming to it under compulsion: the absence of choice in one’s actions constitutes a form of deprivation that undermines well-being. For example, choosing X from a set of possible choices (X and Y) can lead to greater well-being than being forced to choose only X.

From the perspective of the capabilities approach, substantive democracy must avoid the economic trap of confusing means and ends, on the one hand, and final outcomes and overall outcomes, on the other. Indeed, the realm of achievements is richer than that of resources when it comes to assessing quality of life or the impact of public policy on well-being.

However, the value of this approach lies not only in what the individual ultimately achieves — the final outcome (for example, an increase in income) — but also in the full range of real possibilities open to them, whether or not they realise them: these are the overall outcomes. The idea of assessing well-being by incorporating the potential available to a person thus constitutes thefundamental contribution of the capabilities approach, both in political philosophy and in the economics of well-being and development. This approach involves basing empirical assessment on the space of capabilities rather than solely on realised functions.

Furthermore, if we wish theevaluation is to take into account and implement the principle of sensitivity to responsibility, then the approach must necessarily be applied within thedomain of capabilities (Robeyns, 2012: 10). Indeed, it is this domain that allows us to observe the decision-making process that led to the actions taken, and thus to determine what an individual can legitimately be held responsible for.

This principle becomes all the more central when the assessment concerns the issue of social justice and, consequently, substantive democracy. This does not mean that this principle is inoperative in theassessment of well-being, but simply that it takes on particular significance within the context of a normative reflection on responsibility and justice.

However, as Robeyns points out (2012: 10), for practical and empirical reasons, assessments of well-being often omit this principle, focusing primarily on observable outcomes rather than on the trajectories of choice that underpin them.

Ultimately, the relevant domain for assessing substantive democracy is that of capabilities. However, methodological obstacles remain: the informational requirement, the problem of counterfactuals and the existence of unobservable variables make establishing an empirical foundation for assessment in this domain particularly complex.

It is from this perspective that the space of functionings can be regarded as a ‘second best ’, that is to say, an imperfect but often necessary solution given the empirical constraints. As Sen (2000a) points out,

‘Ideally, the capabilities approach should take into account the fullfull scope of freedom to choose amongst different ways of functioning, but practical constraints often force us to limit the analysis to an examination of the basket of actual realisations alone’ (Sen, 2000a: 96).

Nevertheless, the importance of taking into account the idea of substantive democracy — understood as the real possibility of leading the life one has good reason to value — necessitates maintaining the space of capabilities as a central normative reference. Public policy, from this perspective, should endeavour to prioritise this space, despite the practical limitations of its operationalisation.

In this sense, it is more sensible to adopt the capabilities perspective, which is richer in information, than to limit oneself to the more restricted approach of actual outcomes. As Sen (2012b) points out,

‘It is often preferable to rely on a broader assessment of capabilities, even if incomplete, rather than sticking to a narrower framework based solely on observable achievements’ (Sen, 2012b: 292).

3. Democracy as deliberation in the capabilities approach.

In the works of Amartya Sen (1999, 2009) as well as those of Martha Nussbaum (2000, 2011), democracy cannot be reduced to the regular holding of pluralist elections. These authors attach fundamental importance to public debate and collective reasoning in the functioning of democracy.

It is precisely this deliberative conception of democracy that Sen (1999) draws upon to show that it is not an exclusively Western invention, and that historical forms of public debate have existed in various philosophical and political traditions in both Asia and Africa. Thus, democracy is conceived not as a fixed institutional model, but as a social practice based on deliberation.

In economics, this conception is echoed in the work of the Public Choice school, notably that of James Buchanan, for whom democracy must be conceived as a form of government through discussion. This view aligns, on certain points, with Sen’s deliberative conception, even though their theoretical frameworks differ.

It is precisely this participatory and discursive conception of democracy that lies at the heart of the capabilities approach, along two main axes:

1. The first axis concerns the central role accorded to public reasoning in the process of shaping collective choices. For Sen, justice and public policy must result from open, informed and inclusive debates, in which citizens can articulate their experiences, needs and priorities. Public reasoning thus becomes an epistemic and ethical mechanism for building the common good.
2. The second pillar involves recognising participation in public debate as a capability of value in its own right. In other words, the freedom to take part in political discussion is regarded as an essential dimension of well-being and justice. It is not merely to a means of achieving better governance: it is intrinsically constitutive of a dignified life.

In both cases, the implications of the capabilities approach for the role of democracy in the economy are profound and innovative. They call for a rethinking of development policies not only in terms of efficiency or outcomes, but also in terms of participation, recognition and real freedoms. From this perspective, we will analyse the practical implications of this deliberative conception of democracy for how well-being is measured, emphasising the integration of capabilities and public reasoning into assessment tools.

3. 1 public reasoning

Public reasoning is often used interchangeably with the concept of public reason (Drydyk, 2020). However, an important distinction is worth highlighting: public reasoning refers to the actual process of political deliberation, which is often imperfect and influenced by concrete social structures, whilst public reason refers to a standard of legitimacy: political decisions must be justifiablejustified by arguments accessible to all parties concerned.

Amartya Sen is part of a tradition of deliberative political philosophy, alongside Rawls (1971), Dworkin (2006) and the pioneer of the public choice school, James Buchanan (1954). All of them defend, to varying degrees, the idea that democracy cannot be reduced to electoral procedures, but involves an argumentative dialogue between citizens.

Sen thus asserts:

‘The main challenges of a broad conception of democracy are political participation, dialogue and public interaction. The crucial role of public reasoning in democratic practice links the whole question of democracy closely to the central theme of this book: justice ” (Sen, 2010: 389).

Public reasoning therefore refers to the deliberative process through which citizens participate in the formation of social judgements (Sen, 2009: 326), whether in relation to justice, public policy or the choice of capabilities to be promoted.

Within the capabilities approach, this reasoning must be examined in the light of social choice theory, of which Kenneth Arrow (1951) was one of the founders. His famous demonstration of the impossibility of a coherent social choice that satisfies a set of formal democratic requirements marked a turning point:

‘Even under very reasonable conditions regarding the responsiveness of social decisions to the wishes of a society’s members, there is no social choice procedure capable of satisfying individual preferences that can be described as rational and democratic’ (Sen, 2010: 128).

This finding,part of a long-standing tradition dating back to Borda and Condorcet, has long fuelled a certain democratic pessimism in normative economics. However, Sen, building on critiques of welfarism, shows that this impasse stems mainly from the narrowness of the information base on which collective choice procedures are based: voting, utility or income – all these indicators operate within a one-dimensional space.

However, it is possible to overcome this impasse by broadening theinformation to capabilities — that is, to individuals’ actual freedoms to choose between different ways of life. As Sen states:

‘In itself, a voting result does not tell us much, except that one candidate received more votes than another. Similarly, the economic procedure for aggregating national income operates on the basis of limited information: what has been bought and sold, and at what price – nothing else’ (Sen, 2010: 129).

T’capabilities space thus becomes a relevant information base for defining collective choices in a fairer and more democratic manner. The application of public reasoning within this space concerns deliberation on valuable capabilities. This mechanism is not only preferable to voting in certain contexts, but above all it allows us to take account of human diversity and the plurality of conceptions of the good life, whereas Rawlsian theory tends to seek a single consensus.

A decision resulting from public reasoning does not necessarily requireunanimity. Sen criticises the economic tradition based on the search for complete orders in the prioritisation of social choices. However, in reality, preferences are often partial, incomplete or undecidable. Sen proposes to accept incompleteness as a legitimate component of the collective decision-making process. This may be:

• provisional, if it stems from conceptual or technical difficulties;
• reasoned, if it results from limited knowledge or practical constraints;
• or asserted, when it is recognised as constituting the choice itself.

Thus, public reasoning is not intended to produce an exhaustive hierarchy of options, but rather to develop comparative and contextual solutions, focusing on identifying the manifest injustices to be combated, rather than defining a transcendent model of a just society.

This comparative and contextualised approachcontrasts with the transcendental stance adopted by Rawls (1971) and other social contract theorists. Rather than seeking the ideal form of democracy or justice, the aim is to identify cases of indisputable injustice, such as violence against women or the lack of access to healthcare for poor populations.

Two major contributions of this approach are often overlooked in normative economic theory:

1. The primacy of voice over choice. Unlike classical economics, which assumes that (unobservable) preferences are faithfully reflected in (observable) choices, the capabilities approach emphasises the discursive dimension of preferences. Adaptive preferences are a major counter-example to this: a person may make a constrained choice whilst expressing different preferences. What matters in public reasoning is the voice: the ability to justify one’s judgements and to inform the collective debate.

‘A person’s voice may count for two reasons: understanding their interests at stake, and their logic and judgement, which are likely to inform public debate’ (Sen, 2010: 145).

• The distinction between final outcomes and overall outcomes. Sen distinguishes between the final outcome, which concerns solely the observable result of an action, and the overall outcome, which takes into account the process, the agent and the decision-making context. For example, two people staying at home may achieve the same final outcome. But if one stays at home out of fear of attack, and the other by choice (to watch a football match), then their overall outcomes differ, as their actual scope for freedom is not equivalent.

Public reasoning, as advocated by Sen, thus makes it possible to move beyond a strictly consequentialist assessment, by incorporating procedures, contexts, and freedom of choice into the analysis of well-being. It constitutes an essential democratic tool for evaluating public policies and social institutions from a perspective grounded in justice, freedom and the recognition of human diversity.

3. 2 Applying public reasoning to the measurement of social progress

To construct a well-being indicator, the capabilities approach (CA) calls for answers to two fundamental questions: What are the objects of value? and What is the respective value of each of these objects? (Sen, 2000a: 80). The first question relates to the choice of relevant capabilities to represent quality of life; the second concerns their weighting, that is to say, the relative importance to be attributed to them in theassessment of well-being.

CA differs from other approaches to well-being in that it offers a flexible and contextual theoretical framework, capable of incorporating both human diversity and the specific nature of social, cultural and institutional contexts. In this sense, it represents a break with standardised conceptions of well-being, based either on economic aggregates (income, GDP) or on lists of predefined needs.

The approach developed by Sen is open and non-normative: it does not aim to establish a universal and fixed measure of well-being, but rather to provide the conceptual tools for constructing contextually relevant and democratically legitimate assessments. This is why, unlike Martha Nussbaum (2000, 2011), Sen proposes neither a predefined list of valuable capabilities nor a weighting system imposed a priori.

The aim of Capability Approach is not to produce a single standard, but to provide a methodological framework for a participatory assessment process, which allows for public reasoning, collective deliberation and the consideration of the informed preferences of those concerned.

The first fundamental question in operationalising the capabilities approach (CA) concerns the identification of the relevant dimensions for assessing a good life. These dimensions, far from being limited to resources such as income or basic goods (Rawls), refer to real opportunities enabling an individual to lead the life they have reason to value. Thesethese are therefore capabilities. At the collective level, this question becomes more complex: how should one select the capabilities to be valued in a pluralist society, where several conceptions of the good, or ‘rational life projects’ to use Rawlsian terminology, coexist?

For Amartya Sen, the answer must not rest on a normative or technocratic authority, but on an inclusive deliberative process. Thus, the choice of capabilities to be valued must be the result of public deliberation (Sen, 2004), that is to say, a collective dialogue in which citizens are actively involved. This stancecontrasts with a paternalistic approach that would impose a list of dimensions a priori, without taking into account local contexts and the preferences expressed by individuals.

Saith (2001) interprets Sen’s position as a call to “‘giving a voice to the people’. To achieve this, a democratic framework is required, within which social values can emerge through public discussion and debate. The literature already identifies participatory methods compatible with this requirement, such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) or Participatory Learning and Action (PLA), which enable the identification of locally valued capabilities through community exchanges.

Saith (2001) interprets Sen’s position as a call to “give a voice to the people”. To achieve this, a democratic framework is required, within which social values can emerge through public discussion and debate. The literature already identifies participatory methods compatible with this requirement, such as Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) or Participatory Learning and Action (PLA), which enable the identification of locally valued capabilities through community exchanges.

(PRA) or Participatory Learning and Action (PLA), which enable locally valued capabilities to be identified through community exchanges.

Unlike Martha Nussbaum (2000, 2011), who proposes a universal list of ten core capabilities, Sen adopts a procedural and contextualised approach, committed to respecting human diversity and specific cultural frameworks. Whilst he recognises the practical value of a normative list, he emphasises that the legitimacy of a well-being indicator rests on the active participation of citizens in its development.

With this in mind, the capabilities approach offers the possibility of selecting the relevant dimensions in each context or country, by drawing on public reasoning as a mechanism for democratic validation. This process is crucial for producing indicators that truly reflect the quality of life as it is perceived and experienced locally. It also enables a better understanding of the richness, role and uniqueness of certain specific capabilities within a given society.

A concrete illustration of this approach is provided by the experience of Buen Vivir in Bolivia. Enshrined in the 2009 Bolivian Constitution, Buen Vivir embodies a vision of development rooted in indigenous worldviews (notably Aymara and Quechua), based on harmony with nature, the community and oneself. It is not merely an economic indicator, but a broad and culturally rooted conception of well-being, defined througha participatory and deliberative process, akin to public reasoning as advocated by Sen. This initiative demonstrates that it is possible to determine locally which capabilities are to be valued, within a pluralist and democratic framework, without resorting to standards imposed from outside. It also illustrates the institutional translation of collectively discussed values into public policies and normative frameworks, in accordance with the spirit of the capabilities approach.

The second question concerns the weighting given to objects of value (capabilities), both by each individual and by the community as a whole. Once the relevant dimensions have been identified, their degree of importance must be defined; in other words, a hierarchy must be established amongst these objects of value. This question of ranking also relates toa collective decision, and therefore a democratic process based on deliberation.

A common approach, adopted in particular in the work of Martha Nussbaum or in the construction of the Human Development Index (HDI), is to assume that all dimensions are of equal value. With regard to cap, Amartya Sen proposes, on the contrary, that this decision should be the result of public deliberation, in order to avoid the risks of paternalism and excessive abstraction from human diversity.

“ ‘Only a reasoned assessment can successfully carry out this exercise in discrimination,’ asserts Sen (2000b: 110).

At this stage in the operationalisation of thecapabilities approach, Sen contrasts technocracy with democracy. He advocates for the evaluator to adopt a stance that serves democracy, thereby encouraging a participatory approach. In this regard, he writes:

‘It is necessary to assign each component of quality of life or well-being its own weighting for evaluation and to subject it to public discussion and critical scrutiny’ (Sen, 2000b: 114).

Later, Sen (2012b: 296) emphasises the close link between the selection and weighting of capabilities within the framework of public reasoning. According to him, this must be based on social choice theory, which allows the values attributed by individuals to the various dimensions to be ranked.

At this level, dominance-based reasoning is recommended: this method can, in certain cases, lead to a comprehensive and weighted ranking, where it is possible to decide unambiguously which weightings are preferable to others. However, in practice, Sen observes that such a ranking is rarely achievable, due to the complexityof preferences and the diversity of contexts. He therefore proposes using partial rankings, which can be supplemented by the intersection method, which involves establishing hierarchies based on points of convergence.

However, as Sen (2000a: 88) writes, this method ‘increases the possibilities for decision-making and structuring, but does not eliminate undecidability’. This undecidability remains ever-present in the process of theorising and evaluating the capabilities approach. Some capabilities may be incommensurable, or give rise to such profound differences that it becomes impossible to reach a consensus on the weightings to be adopted.

In such cases, Sen (2000a) proposes accepting incompleteness, which he describes either as a ‘fundamental reason’ (when it is inherent in the nature of value judgements) or as a ‘pragmatic reason ” (when it results from informational or methodological limitations). It is therefore a matter of recognising the limitations of the classification, without for that reason abandoning participatory and democratic evaluation.

4. Rethinking the agent of democracy beyond the voter: the function of agency.

In the list of basic capabilities (as defined by Sen) or core capabilities (as defined by Nussbaum), the genuine freedom to make one’s voice heard and to participate in public decision-making features alongside health and education. This capability has both instrumental and intrinsic value. Indeed, enjoying political freedoms — being able to express one’s opinion at the time decisions are made — undeniably contributes to strengthening self-esteem and well-being.

This freedom is also reflected in the relationship that citizens have with institutions. The concept of ‘political poverty’ developed by Dahou (2008) helps to characterise this type of relationship: a form of relational poverty between decision-making bodies and the population concerned. Corruption, unequal access to public services, subordination and perceptions of public policies are all telling indicators of this dimension. These factors highlight the importance of this capability in assessing quality of life.

According to Nussbaum (2006, 2011), the core capability entitled ‘Control over one’s environment ’ encompasses the realisation of civil, political and economic rights. It comprises two components:

A) Political: being able to participate effectively in political life. This includes negative freedoms (freedom of expression, assembly, association and the right to vote), as well as positive freedoms, such as the ability to influence decisions affecting one’s life.

B) Material: being able to exercise one’s property rights on an equal footing, to access employment, to be protected against arbitrary treatment and to work in a respectful environment. Working as a human being involves being able to exercise practical reason and to enter into relationships of mutual recognition with one’s peers (Nussbaum, 2011: 57).

According to Nussbaum, this capability is the prerequisite for the autonomous, dignified and non-oppressive exercise of all other capabilities. It represents a pillar of substantive democracy and a fair economy. Several empirical studies confirm the positive correlation between political participation and subjective well-being (Owen et al., 2008; Frey & Stutzer, 2002a, 2002b).

Unlike Nussbaum, Sen emphasises the freedom toagency as a democratic end. Contrary to the individualistic and utilitarian assumption of neoclassical economics — where the agent is motivated solely by self-interest — the capabilities approach recognises that not all human actions are directed solely towards well-being. Individuals are also moral agents, capable of acting for reasons independent of their personal satisfaction.

‘People must be regarded as actively involved — if given the opportunity — in shaping their own destiny, and not as passive recipients of the benefits of clever development programmes.” (Sen, 1999: 53)

Thus, agency’agency is, for Sen, a consequence of the capability ‘control over one’s environment’. It broadens the analysis of democracy beyond actual opportunities, towards the possibility of acting responsibly. Such action may even involve compromising one’s own well-being in the service of a cause deemed just.

The example of the nurse (Sen, 2000a) illustrates this point well: if this woman chooses to go to Gaza to help victims, even though she could enjoy greater comfort following a promotion, she is acting in pursuit of a goal of agency. She sacrifices her well-being to fulfil a moral imperative. Thus, the freedom of well-being (capabilities) does not always translate into realised well-being if it is mobilised for purposes of agency.

In this sense, substantive democracy also presupposes the recognition of this agency. It transforms the citizen froma mere voter or utilitarian consumer into a moral agent. The example of citizen mobilisations in Senegal between 2021 and 2023, where some risked their jobs or shared their resources to defend a democratic cause, is a contemporary illustration of this.

Finally, this conception of agency is closely aligned with the ethics of care (Gilligan, Brugère…), which emphasises relational responsibility, vulnerabilities and interdependence. Sen pays little attention to this dimension, yet it is essential to the effective exercise of agency: care, emotional bonds and moral commitments are the ‘ blind spots’ of agency, which is nonetheless constitutive of a true democracy.

Conclusion

The capabilities approach provides an innovative theoretical framework for rethinking social inequalities, poverty and social justice in economics. Whilst its theoretical relevance has been widely recognised, its practical application has met with some scepticism. However, the empirical work of Kuklys (2005), Krishnakumar (2007), Schokkaert and Van Ootegem (2011), amongst others, has helped to broaden the use of this approach, particularly in the field of development economics.

What remains less explored, however, is the relationship between the capabilities approach and social choice theory. It is precisely at this intersection that the approach finds its most fruitful scope for conceptualising substantive democracy. Indeed, as early as in *Social Choice and Welfare* (1971), Sen introduced public reasoning as a response to the problem of aggregating individual preferences in a democratic context. The aim of this paper has been to show how the capabilities approach can offer an innovative interpretation of substantive democracy from three perspectives:

Firstly, the capabilities framework as a means of assessing social situations, enabling well-being to be measured not only in terms of resources or formal freedoms, but through the actual freedoms toto act and to be. Secondly, public reasoning as a mechanism for collective deliberation, introducing democratic participation into the very definition of indicators of social progress. Thirdly, the function of agency as an ethical and political expression of citizenship, broadening the figure of the‘voter’ to that of a moral actor committed to building the common good.

These three dimensions form the basis of an enriched conception of democracy, going beyond electoral proceduralism by incorporating issues of justice, recognition and genuine freedom.

However, this perspective raises two major limitations. The first concerns the absence of collective capabilities in Sen’s thinking, which is often centred on individualist ethics (which regards the individual as the sole value from a moral perspective). In this respect, the introduction of the commons and thethe integration of philosophies such as Ubuntu or Agaciro could enable us to conceive of valuable collective capabilities (Ibrahim, 2020), rooted in African community-based approaches.

The second limitation is anthropocentric in nature. Nussbaum (2023), unlike Sen, extends capabilities to animals, which are regarded as beings endowed with dignity. This openness invites us to consider extending capabilities to all living things as a whole – including plants – from an ecosystemic perspective. African animist traditions, which recognise subjectivity in the non-human, can inform this shift towards an ecological and interspecies democracy.

In short, conceptualising substantive democracy through thecapabilities approach enables us to articulate freedom, justice and agency within an ethical vision of the economy. But this also requires enriching this framework by incorporating the concerns of the collective, the non-human and the diverse knowledge systems of the Global South.